Invisible Concealment of Invisibility Crypto-Judaism as a Theological Paradigm of Racial Anti-Semitism by Lapidot, Elad
religions
Essay
Invisible Concealment of Invisibility Crypto-Judaism
as a Theological Paradigm of Racial Anti-Semitism
Elad Lapidot
Institute of Philosophy, Freie Universität Berlin, Habelschwerdter Allee 30, 14195 Berlin, Germany;
elapidot@gmail.com
Received: 1 October 2018; Accepted: 30 October 2018; Published: 1 November 2018


Abstract: The motif of secret, crypto-Judaism has a history that reaches further back into the
theological tradition. It no doubt structurally arises from or closely related to the epistemo-political
challenges posed by the unworldliness and absolutely inner being of faith, which in the political or
inter-subjective dimension immediately raises the question of evidence. The question of evidence,
i.e., for the invisible faith, becomes acute in the case of conversion, where the basic premise is the
initial absence of faith. Paradoxically, conversion is consequently the establishment of the convert’s
fundamental faithlessness, of her originally non-Christian element, which the convert, in the very
same act of conversion, claims no longer exists. It is easy to see the conceptual constellation that
would present the convert as structural deception. At the Iberian threshold of modernity, in the face of
mass Jewish conversion and assimilation, this paradox appeared in the image of the “new Christians”,
the marranos, structurally suspected to be crypto-Jews, to the effect that the ultimate evidence of faith
was a certificate of limpieza de sangre, “purity of blood”. This paper will follow the historian Yosef
HayimYerushalmi in tracing the conceptual link between the Inquisition’s notion of crypto-Jews and
the racialized figure of the Jew in modern anti-Semitism.
Keywords: crypto-Judaism; Judaism; anti-Semitism; epistemology; politics; religion; theology;
Christianity; race
The notion of secret, crypto-Judaism has a history that reaches back into the Christian theological
tradition. It arises structurally from or closely related to the epistemo-political challenges posed by
conceptions concerning the unworldliness and absolutely inner being of faith. Such notions of inner
being, posited in the realm of politics, society or inter-subjectivity, immediately raise the question of
evidence. The question of evidence, i.e., for the inner and thus externally, inter-subjectively invisible
faith, becomes acute in the case of conversion, where the basic premise is the initial absence of faith.
Paradoxically, conversion is consequently the establishment of the convert’s fundamental faithlessness,
of her originally non-Christian element, which the convert, in the very same act of conversion, claims
no longer exists. It is easy to see the conceptual constellation that would lead to presenting the convert
as a structural deception.
At the Iberian threshold of modernity, in the face of mass Jewish conversion and assimilation,
this paradox appeared in the image of the “new Christians”, the marranos, structurally suspected to
be crypto-Jews, to the effect that the ultimate evidence of faith (for eligibility to high office) was a
certificate of limpieza de sangre, “purity of blood”. According to historian Yosef HayimYerushalmi,
the limpieza de sangre statutes obtained the highest level of official recognition, by both pope and king,
in 1555, “as the last vestiges of active crypto-Judaism seemed to be disappearing and there was no basis
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for doubting the attachment of most of the New Christians to the Catholic religion”.1 In other words,
blood, socially invisible element of life, emerges as a political marker with the complete disappearance
of its supposed socially and culturally visible manifestations.2 This could be described as the political
emergence of race in the Jewish body.
Indeed, the logic of limpieza de sangre—invisible blood as evidence for invisible faith—is pushed to
greater extremes on the other side of modernity’s threshold, as the transformation of Jewish being is no
longer carried out as conversion, i.e., as change of inner essence, as transubstantiation, but as assimilation,
i.e., as change of appearance, as a phenomenal change, whereby Jews remain Jews—ever more so in
view of the disappearance of all socio-cultural manifestations of Jewishness. The ensuing structural
deception was clearly invoked in 1843 by the first theologian of the Jewish Question, Bruno Bauer:
“Only by way of sophistry, of seeming, would the Jew be able to remain in state life; if he wishes
to remain Jew, the mere seeming would prevail and become the essence.”3 Essence as seeming, so
I wish to claim in this essay, will indeed become in anti-Semitism4 the very operative definition of
the Jewish race, of the Jewish as race, the paradigmatic political performance of which would be the
“secret society”.
The idea that the Iberian figure of the crypto-Jew is a precursor of the anti-Semitic figure of
the racial Jew was already voiced by Yosef HayimYerushalmi, in fact this was the main suggestion
of his afore-mentioned essay, subtitled “From the Spanish Limpieza de Sangre to Nazism”. Pointing
at “common traits” and “morphological affinities”5, Yerushalmicalled into question the scholarly
maxim of “radical rupture” (id., 25) between premodern religious anti-Judaism and modern racial
anti-Semitism, and more specifically “the never questioned postulate of incompatibility in principle
between Christianism and racial conceptions” (id., 27). He spoke instead of “latent racial anti-Semitism
in premodern Christian Europe” (id.), “actualized” in Spain and Portugal. The difference to modern
“organized forms of political anti-Semitism” arises according to Yerushalmi mainly from “the totalizing
pretentions of modern ideologies” (id., 29), i.e., not from any fundamental conceptual difference.
In what follows, I wish to develop Yerushalmi’s observation, by looking more closely at basic
epistemo-political elements in the properly speaking anti-Semitic discourse, from Wilhelm Marr
to Adolph Hitler. My analysis will show how anti-Semitic political epistemology could in fact be
described as arising from and giving radical expression to the conceptual paradoxes already contained
in the theo-political figure of the crypto-Jew.6
1. Anti-Semitic Discourse
My analysis focuses on the historical discourse that can be most properly referred to as
“anti-Semitism”. The propriety of this designation arises partly from the fact that at important
moments and in considerable circles this discourse has referred to itself explicitly, declaratively, as
anti-Semitism; and partly because this is how it has been and still is referred to without exception
from the perspective of historical reflection, mostly critical, largely anti-anti-Semitic. It should be
reminded however that “anti-Semitism” has in no way been the sole or even dominant or most
1 On the question of the relation between premodern Iberian limpieza de sangre and modern racial anti-Semitism, see Yerushalmi
and Carnaud (1993, p. 18).
2 See Anidjar (2014), asserting “blood is the element of Christianity”, such that “a consideration of what blood reflects,
produces, and sustains, what it engenders, must take—as one adopts—the form of a critique of Christianity” (ix).
3 Bauer (1843, pp. 176–78).
4 Current academic discourse employs “antisemitism”. One of the goals of this essay, however, is to recall attention to the
epistemic nature of the modern anti-Jewish ideology designated by that name, i.e., its existence as a form of knowledge,
a negative knowledge, “anti-”, which refers to some object, “Semitism”. It is my claim that the epistemic nature of
anti-Semitism has been more or less explicitly suppressed by current academic discourse, an anti-anti-Semitic discourse, not
the least through the orthography “antisemitism”. My deviation from common usage is therefore intentional and purposeful.
5 Yerushalmi and Carnaud (1993, p. 8).
6 For an analysis of the marrano as a paradigm of modern Jewish philosophy, focusing on the question of language, see
Bielik-Robson (2014).
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characteristic self-designation of this discourse. In its most crucial moments this term is absent or, as
in Nazi Germany after 1935, even explicitly rejected.7 Referring to this discourse as “anti-Semitism”,
and thus positing this name and concept as the assembling center around which the perception and
comprehension of this discourse are delineated and organized—this operation is a central feature of
what I propose to call the discourse of contemporary “anti-anti-Semitism”, the central tendency of
which is to dissociate anti-Semitism from the Jews. Accordingly, a basic effort of my own so to speak
anti-anti-anti-Semitic analysis of anti-Semitism will be to suspend the very designation “anti-Semitism”,
at least as a defining term for the conceptual unity of this discourse, i.e., for what constitutes it as one,
as this specific discourse. Instead, as an initial and tentative attempt, I will indicate a few elements that,
so it seems to me, constitute the specificity of so-called anti-Semitism as a reaction to and reformulation
of the Jewish Question, and thus, fundamentally, as a modern perception and, most broadly speaking,
knowledge of Jewish being.
It may sound trivial, but is not: anti-Semitism’s central concern has indeed been the Question of the
Jews. The Question of the Jews, or Jewish Question, is not an abstract question, but a concrete historical
discourse. The Jewish Question has arisen from and concerns what is known as the emancipation of the
Jews, the event in which Jews were to become part of the modern European polity.8 A central, perhaps
the central motif of anti-Semitism is the notion or image of Jewish emancipation and assimilation as
a defining event of modernity, and thus of the Jewish Question as the decisive question of modern
politics. This radical significance given to Jews by anti-Semitism, in manifold expressions, from early
programmatic manifestos to the global politics of the Third Reich, in which the Jews feature as a corner
stone for the entire structure of worldview and agenda, this radical significance is without doubt one
of the greatest mysteries posed by anti-Semitism to anti-anti-Semitism.
More specifically, however, anti-Semitic discourse is defined by a fundamental skepsis regarding
the precise nature and significance of the Jewish event of modernity. In this discourse, the emancipation
and assimilation of the Jews, rather than signifying the ultimate triumph of human progress and
civilization, signifies its ultimate downfall. At work here is something like a critical phenomenology:
the disappearance of the Jews by the effect of assimilation would not arise from the non-existence of
the Jews, but rather from their omnipresence, what Marx, in his famous response to Bruno Bauer, called
“the Judaism of bourgeois society”9. It is this basic observation, in its specific anti-Semitic interpretation,
which has no doubt guided the thought of Wilhelm Marr, “the Patriarch of anti-Semitism”, who was
greatly influenced by Marx.10 Marr’s most well-known work, published in 1879, was indeed called
The Triumph of Judaism over Germanism. Considered from a Non-Confessional Standpoint11. This text
is deemed as one of the first anti-Semitic manifests, though it makes no mention of the term
“anti-Semitism” (it does occasionally use “Semitic”). In it, Marr writes: “I hereby loudly proclaim, with
no ironic intention, the triumph of Judaism in world history” (TJ, 4). The same self-conscious spirit
of paradox and social critique (“with no ironic intention”) seems to characterize all proclamations on
the Verjudung, the “Jewification” of modern society, such as another of Marr’s sources of inspiration,
Richard Wagner12, and one of the louder voices of French anti-Semitism, Edouard Droumond, who a
few years after Marr exposed “The Jewish France”.13
7 Nipperdy and Rürup (1972, p. 151). See also Zimmermann (1986).
8 On the semantic history of the “Jewish Question”, see Toury (1966). Toury’s general conclusion was that “[t]he catchword
Judenfrage emerged at the crossroads between old and new Jewry and between traditional Jew-hatred and new extreme
antisemitism. In its anti-Jewish context it denied the feasibility of emancipation, or—where emancipation had been
granted—its capability of solving the problem of Jewish integration” (p. 106).
9 Marx (1981, p. 374).
10 “The Patriarch of anti-Semitism” is how Marr reportedly called himself, see Zimmermann (1986, p. vii). For Marx’s influence
on Marr, see Marx (1981, p. 73).
11 Marr (1879).
12 Wagner (Wagner 1869, p. 12), writing on the Verjudung of modern art.
13 (Drumont 1886).
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The title of Marr’s book reveals, however, another basic feature of anti-Semitic discourse.
The alleged “Triumph of Judaism” is over Germanentum, “Germanism”. In other words,
the paradigmatic rivalry and difference of Judaism, the paradigmatic difference that constitutes
“Judaism”, is not understood to be a difference vis-à-vis Christianity. Indeed, as Marr’s subtitle asserts,
anti-Semitism is the formulation and deployment of the Jewish Question “from a non-confessional
standpoint”. This is a crucial point. Anti-Semitism seems to fully subscribe to Marx’s critique of Bauer,
namely his critique of the religious-theological, the basically Christian framing of the Jewish Question.
Indeed, one of the central solidarities between anti-Semitism and its anti-anti-Semitic critique is,
as Yerushalmi pointed out, the assertion of a fundamental break and rupture, a decisive difference,
between “modern” non-religious anti-Semitism and “traditional” religious anti-Judaism. Marr in fact
sounds almost like quoting Marx when he declares that the Question of the Jews is not confessional but
rather “a social-political question” (id., 41). That the phenomenon of Judaism is not primarily religious,
and thus should not be primarily interpreted and not even thematized in “confessional” categories,
is also what Adolph Hitler will later describe as a formative realization, namely that the Jews are “not
German of a special confession, but a different people”.14 This proclaimed non-Christian perception
of Judaism will manifest itself in the Nazis refusal to recognize Jewish converts to Christianity as
non-Jews. In fact, anti-Semitism may be said to have gone even beyond Marx in de-Christianizing
Judaism. Seemingly, anti-Semitic discourse departs from Christian theology so radically, that, unlike
Marx, it no longer even names the object of its antagonism by the Christian category of “the Jews”,
but rather reverts to the scientifically sounding term “Semitism”.
It is important to indicate the significance and potential fruitfulness of critiquing the dominance
of Christian theological perception of the Jews, down to the very category “Jew”. Indeed, as is
often the case in the dynamics and history of discourse and thought, anti-Semitic discourse too,
even in its worst, contains elements of enhanced clarity, in this case concerning the question of
the Jews. Accordingly, be that in distorted forms and to sinister effects, it may strangely allow the
appearance of a non-Christian image of the Jews, which would be closer to a Jewish self-understanding.
Thus, the afore-mentioned Nazi non-recognition of Jews’ conversion to Christianity as expunging
their Jewishness, which, as I will immediately discuss, was motivated racially, and has been justly
condemned as such, nonetheless has been de facto the dismissal of a Christian principle, i.e., faith,
as defining Jewish being, which in this sense is consistent with historically dominant inner Jewish
perspectives. Obviously, not believing in Christ has not been the foundational principle of historical
Jewish self-understanding.
And yet, on a closer look, the contrast between anti-Semitism and theological anti-Judaism is
less radical than both anti-Semitism and anti-anti-Semitism have it seem. On the level of naming,
as already mentioned, the “Semitic” terminology has scarcely ever replaced the “Jewish”. Interestingly,
as Moshe Zimmermann showed, Marr’s partner in founding the Anti-Semiten-Liga, the “League of
Anti-Semites”, in the same year that Marr’s book was published, 1879, understood “Semitism” to
designate a specifically Jewish mindset, expressed in Jewish religion, to the exclusion of non religious
“Jewish Germans”.15 In this sense, the term “anti-Semitism”, with its “appearance of scientificity”,
served to designate the spirit of Judaism, in contrast to Jewish being merely in the flesh. In other words,
the term “anti-Semitism” may be even said to have had an anti-racist intention. The continuity with
Christian anti-Judaism manifests itself, however, most clearly in the fact that anti-Semites, in contrast
to Marx, never ceased from speaking of Jews. Whereas Marx, after the polemic with Bauer “On the
Jewish Question”, will scarcely ever again write about “Jews”, will indeed replace the theological
categories of Christians and Jews with socio-economico-political categories such as Bourgeois and
Proletariats, Jews—and not “Semites”—are the constant center of anti-Semitism. Long before the Nazis
14 (Hitler 1943).
15 Zimmermann (1986, p. 91).
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prohibited the use of the term “anti-Semitism” for describing their anti-Jewish politics, already in 1907,
one of the most canonic anti-Semitic texts of the time, the title of which tellingly asserting its canonicity
in theological terms, Anti-Semiten-Katechismus, “the Catechism of the Anti-Semites”, changed its title to
Handbuch der Judenfrage, the “Handbook of the Jewish Question”. The “Catechism” had been published
by Theodor Fritsch since 1887, and from the very beginning defined “anti-Semites” as “anti-Jewish”
(Judengegner).16 8 years earlier, the League of Anti-Semites, in its bylaws, defines its objective as “saving
our German fatherland from the complete Verjudung”.17
In fact, considered from the point of view of political epistemology, as Yerushalmi noted, “modern”
anti-Semitism is intimately connected to “religious” anti-Judaism. In epistemo-political terms, so I
wish to argue, its “anti-confessional” standpoint does not as radically break with theology as Marx
did. Rather, it remains within the same discourse and only performs it from a different standpoint.
This standpoint, so my basic claim, the standpoint or perspective of “political” anti-Semitism
within the Christian theological discourse, has as its organizing concept the category of “race”.
Epistemo-politically, “race” stands in a fundamentally different kind of opposition to “faith” as
“class”. The anti-theological force of Marx’s notion of “class” is the attempted localization of political
being and agency within social history, in explicit polemics with the utopian unworldliness—the
“illusion”—of Christian spirit as consummated in the bourgeois state. In contrast to this, the force
of the notion of “race” is the attempted scientific grounding of the spirit’s consummation in modern
enlightenment. Race is the negative of Spirit: it is the negative a-historical ground of history, which is
nothing but the history of race’s negation in the gradual “progress of spiritualism”.18
2. Racial Epistemology of the Invisible
It is indeed the concept and idea of “race” that shapes anti-Semitic politics, from Marr to Hitler.
My claim is that “political” anti-Semitism draws the most fundamental consequences from this category.
I already noted how for the anti-Semites the emancipation and assimilation, i.e., the disappearance
of the Jews in the modern polity, constitutes the critical political event of modernity. I also noted
how the anti-Semites, like Marx’s “On the Jewish Question”, see in this disappearance “the triumph
of Judaism”. Both Marx and the anti-Semites thus indeed interpret the disappearance of the Jews
not as the dissolution but on the contrary as the full realization of Jewish being. This, however, in
two fundamentally different ways. For Marx, “Judaism” is a socio-political form that “disappeared”
only insofar as it has become all too visible, in the omnipresent form of the “moneymen”. For the
anti-Semites, in contrast, the disappearance of the Jews means literally that the Jews have become
invisible, imperceptible in any social and cultural phenomena, and it is this very invisibility which
constitutes the consummation of Jewish being, namely as a “Semitic race”19. Indeed, in contrast
to Ernest Renan, for instance, who identifies the contemporary paradigm of Semitic race-spirit in
Muslim Turkey, the most visible Other of Christian Europe,20 for the anti-Semites, the paradigmatic
phenomenon of the Semitism is the invisibility of the assimilated European Jews.
This fundamental anti-Semitic position could in fact be said to be more consistent with the
category of “race” than Renan’s. Race, as the negative of spirit and just like spirit, lies outside of
history. It is the key to history inasmuch as history is the manifestation, expression and therefore
phenomenon or trace of race. However, history remains mere phenomenon of race—it is not race itself.
The force of the race category is precisely that it transcends history. Accordingly, inasmuch as historical,
social, political, cultural phenomena can be traced back to race, race itself cannot be traced back to
16 (Fritsch 1893).
17 des Vereins (1879).
18 Renan (1855): “[A] progress of spiritualism, because it is an effort to make men forget their earthly origin, and only keep the
brotherhood resulting from their divine nature”.
19 Marr (1879, p. 23).
20 Renan (1859).
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such phenomena. It is rather its independence or difference from historical and cultural phenomena
that constitutes the essence of race. It follows that inasmuch as history manifests race, race presents
itself most purely in detachment from history, namely as non-manifest or invisible in the historical
and cultural medium. It is in its historical invisibility that race is most present, as I indicated at the
beginning in the limpieza de sangre.
There is here a conceptual dynamics at work, which is no doubt akin to the logic operative in
certain (perhaps Gnostic) constellations of the theological relation between God and world, and in
certain (perhaps Heideggerian) conceptions of the ontological relation between Being (Seyn) and
beings (Seiende). Be that as it may, it is possible, based on the aforesaid fundamental conception of race
outside of history, for which the crypto-Jew would be a premodern paradigm, to sketch a very general
outline of something like anti-Semitic political epistemology. This epistemology, far from being naïve
or unreflective, in fact possesses some central features of critical thought, namely—to recall Adorno
and Horkheimer—of enlightenment, insofar as it is based on a profound doubt vis-à-vis phenomena
and received knowledge. However, as its object, “race”, presents itself in invisibility, anti-Semitic
epistemology is not just suspicious in face of phenomena, it does not just look for better or more certain
evidence, but looks beyond or before evidence—looks against evidence. Whereas, therefore, Renan
posited race as the foundation of science—philology and ethnography—, anti-Semitic epistemology is
pronouncedly anti-scientific.
In fact, the anti-phenomenal relation that anti-Semitism asserts to its object, Jewish being,
as race, challenges the limits of what can be called “knowledge”. A basic operation of anti-Semitic
epistemology is indeed to discredit and consequently to deactivate all epistemic spaces, all media,
in which its object may become visible, known. Anti-Semitism is anti-media. More specifically,
it disqualifies the spaces of inter-subjective communication, where knowledge is generated as a
collective process, as epistemo-polity, and within which the assimilation of Jews was to take place by
way of disappearance. Anti-Semitism discredits the socio-political media in which Jews were to become
invisible: intellectual discourse, literature, press, economy.21 It does so by qualifying all these media
as “Jewish”, thus explaining the invisibility of the Jews by their omnipresence. In contrast to Marx,
however, for whom the media—“society”—is ultimate reality, which means that bourgeois society is
Jewish, for the anti-Semites “Jewish” media is a lie, which conceals reality, i.e., the real, unassimilated
and unassimilable Jewish race.
I once again wish to underline the conceptual solidarity or at least commensurability that this
anti-Semitic epistemology, in contrast to the Marxist one, entertains with religious discourse, insofar as
it revolves around unworldly faith. There is a statement of Hitler that provides a radical formulation of
this situation, when he writes about the Jews, that “their entire existence is already built on one big lie,
namely that what they are is a religious congregation, while [in fact] it is a race”22. Thus, socio-political
media provides the phenomenal space for the apparition of Jewish assimilation, which means the
apparition of Jewish invisibility in the socio-political sphere, according to which Jewish being is a
non-political existence, a “religious congregation” of faith. This religious invisibility, however, would
be a lie, the lie: a false invisibility that conceals a true invisibility, namely that of race. Race is the
invisible behind the invisible, a real invisible concealed by a fake invisible.
I will shortly discuss the political implications of this epistemology of double invisibility.
However, first I wish to indicate, next to its negative, anti-medial aspect, also its positive aspect,
whereby anti-Semitism does assert knowledge of Jews. This knowledge can only be of course
immediate knowledge, a highly paradoxical notion, which contains all the epistemological tensions and
ambivalences animating the relations between evidence and presence and in fact seems to abolish the
fundamental condition of the knowledge relation. Be that as it may, anti-Semitic discourse articulates
21 See Fritsch (Fritsch 1893, pp. 17–18); Drumont (Drumont 1886, p. xv); Dühring (Dühring 1892, pp. 13, 55).
22 Hitler (Hitler 1943, p. 253).
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itself in fact most frequently in an epistemically critical and reflective manner, its negation of media
always entailing the invocation of immediate knowledge or presence, which is most frequently the
“instinct”. “Instinct” is the liminal epistemic faculty, the proto-cognitive dimension, in which “race” is
epistemically operative. “Instinct” is accordingly the faculty by which anti-Semitism asserts immediate
relation to and knowledge of Jewish racial being. It is noteworthy how the immediacy of instinct,
which explicitly operates as subversive to socio-political media and establishment, and in fact can only
possess racial generality, i.e., the generality of organic species, that can only operate in the individual,
is nonetheless embodied in anti-Semitic discourse as a socio-political, collective figure: “the people”.
In contrast to and as countermeasure against the press and literature that corrupt the intellectual,
the educated, the cultivated, gebildete mind, the philosopher Eugen Dühring, for grounding his view
on “The Jewish Question as a Question of Racial Detriment [Racenschändlichkeit] for the Existence,
Morals and Culture of the Peoples” (1880), thus invoked the “natural instincts and feeling” and the
“immediate impressions” of “the low people and the common citizen”.23 Similarly, the historian
Heinrich von Treitschke, summoned “the instinct of the masses”, the alleged generator of popular
anti-Semitism, as the truth-sensor for his famous pronouncement of the same anti-Semitic year of 1879
that “the Jews are our misfortune!”24 In France too, forremoving the veil of Jewish press and literature,
and seeing the Jewish France, Drumond wrote, “C’est dans la rue que jevous propose de regarder”, “I suggest
that you look at the street”, using “the patriot’s common sense”.25 Another one of Marr’s sources of
inspiration, Richard Wagner, in his Judentum in der Musik (1850), already appealed to the “instinct-like”,
“natural” and “unconscious sensation, which emerges in the people as innermost repulsion against the
Jewish essence”.26 Whereas Wagner went ahead to explore this “unconscious sensation” of repulsion
in the auditory realm, “in music”, it is rather olfactory sensation, “smell”, that will reveal to young
Hitler the essence of Jews: “I often grew sick to my stomach from the smell of these caftan wearers”27.
It is illustrative to indicate how this radical anti-scientific epistemology of race related more
specifically to the realm of language, which, based on the traditional and common conception of
“language as expression of the soul”, was for Renan the primary medium of race’s “manifestation” and
consequently the primary medium for his philological race science.28 Language has in fact been one of
the most important media of Jewish assimilation. It is as German, French writers that the specifically
Jewish being of Jewish authors could disappear, concretely accomplishing Renan’s “progress of
spiritualism”. It is thus that language has become one of the important fronts of anti-Semitism. It is
of course a highly complex front, since, anti-Semitism itself operating in language, it could not so
simply discredit this medium as “Jewish”. Accordingly, discussion on language has given rise to
radicalized expression of anti-Semitism’s race epistemology, in which, as stated above, the expression
or manifestation of race (language) is eo ipso the concealment of race.
It is against this concealment, this pseudo-assimilation that conceals crypto-difference,
that Wagner wrote on “The Jews in Music”. According to him, it is indeed not on the manifest
or visible level of language, but rather on the latent, subliminal, “unconscious” level that the essence
of language would lie. If language constitutes a “historical communality”, nonetheless “only he who
grew up unconsciously in this communality also takes part in its creation”.29 Against all appearance,
therefore, the Jew, who has been “standing outside of this communality”, necessarily speaks “modern
European languages” always “as a foreigner” (id. 14), a radical foreignness that Wagner extends by
the power of metaphor to “[o]ur entire European civilization and art”, which “remained for the Jews
23 Dühring (Dühring 1892, pp. 3, 55).
24 von Treitschke (1879, pp. 572, 575).
25 Drumont (Drumont 1886, p. xx).
26 Wagner (Wagner 1869, pp. 9–11).
27 Hitler (Hitler 1943, p. 51).
28 Renan (1855, p. 101). For a broader discussion on the interplay between modern science of language and modern science of
race, see Olender (1989); see also Hutton (1999).
29 Wagner (Wagner 1869, p. 15).
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a foreign language” (id. 15). Echoing native or mother tongue ideologies, such as Schleiermacher’s
(“one [produces originally] only in one’s mother tongue”30), Wagner thus proclaims that the foreigner,
the Jew, may only imitate or reproduce, never “really speak, make poems or create works of art” (id.).
The evidence for this latent foreignness, which Wagner paradoxically still insists on providing, he thus
locates not in the semantics of language, but, as already noted above, in language as sensation, as
sound. It is in the music of language, in singing that Wagner identifies “the liveliest and irrefutably
truest expression of the person’s essential sensation” (id. 17). Jewish foreignness would manifest itself
acoustically in the “Semitic pronunciation”, i.e., “the hissing, shrilling, humming and flawed sound
expression” (id. 15).
This last paradoxical piece of evidence for the invisible Jewish foreignness behind the invisible
Jewish sameness in language is rendered unnecessary and in fact impossible by the ever radicalizing
discourse of Hitler, who draws the last consequences from the understanding of language as
“expression” of thought: “A person can simply change the language, i.e., he can use a different
language; in the new language, however, he will express the old thoughts; his inner essence will not
change”.31 Indeed, race, the “inner essence”, is only expressed in and manifested by language, but is
not language. Language still belongs to media, to society, to history—to exteriority, or in Lutheran
terms, to “works”. It is indeed at this point that the intimacy of race and spirit, race and pistis, becomes
visible, as “race spirit” is embodied in one phenomenon of “inner essence”—the essence, the spirit,
the liquid of life: “blood”.32 “Race does not lie in language, but only in blood, something that no one
knows better than the Jew, who in fact places only very little value on preserving his language, and
rather all value on keeping his blood pure”. (id., 342).
3. The Secret Race State
I will shortly discuss this anti-Semitic motif of identifying the Jew as the paradigm of race,
an identification that may seem contradictory in Hitler’s race politics. Before that, however, I wish to
point at the latter’s politically crucial conclusion regarding language, which in fact stands in direct
opposition to Renanian philology. If for Renan’s science language manifests race, for Hitler—who
on this point, as I indicated, is more consistent with the logic of race—language conceals race.
“The language of the Jew”, he writes, “is for him not the means to express his thoughts, but the
means to conceal them. Speaking French, he thinks Jewish.” (id., 337). This is the logic that will later
guide the “12 Theses Against the Un-German Spirit”, a flyer formulating the platform of the Nazi
students’ Aktion that culminated in the book burnings of May 1933, in demanding that “Jewish works
shall be published in the Hebrew language. If they are published in German, they shall be designated
as translations”.33
In fact, the anti-epistemic epistemology of anti-Semitism, the epistemology of double invisibility,
carries inherent political implications, is eo ipso political epistemology. It is after all for a certain
politics that ant-Semitism has primarily become the name. I already indicated the formally similar
assertions of both Marx and the anti-Semites about shifting the Jewish Question from religion to
politics, and their formally similar underlying anti-religious or anti-Christian critique. For Marx,
this initially meant re-interpreting Jewish particularity as the specificity of a certain socio-political
practice, i.e., egoism, which subsequently meant abandoning “Jews” as a political category and
politically significant historical agent altogether. Anti-Semitism, in contrast, turns the de-christianized
Jews into a paradigm of politics—a paradigm of a people, a paradigm of a state. Indeed, one of the
fundamental operations of anti-Semitic discourse has been to assert the political essence of Judaism
30 “[J]eder [producireursprünglich] nur in seiner Muttersprache”; see ibid., 60. Über die verschiedenenMethoden des Übersetzens
(“On the Various Methods of Translating”), written in 1813, Störig (1963).
31 Hitler (Hitler 1943, p. 342)
32 Anidjar (2014, p. viii).
33 See Treß (2003, 2009).
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against its religious interpretation. Wilhelm Marr’s basic observation from his “non-confessional
standpoint” was: “The Jewish ‘confession’ was nothing more than the statutes of a people”.34 Judaism
is not a religion but “the particular Jewish state” (id., 9). I already mentioned Hitler’s constitutive
realization that Jews are “not German of a special confession, but a different people [ein Volk fürsich]”.35
In support for this claim he refers, among others, as Eichmann will too in Jerusalem, to Zionism36,
and to the “factual” nature of the Talmud: “In fact, the Talmud too is not a book of preparation for the
hereafter, but only for practical and tolerable life in this world”.37
Visible here is the assertion of “the people” against “confession”: the Jews are not confession
but a people; the Talmud is not about the hereafter but about this world. I already indicated how
this allegedly anti-Christian position is in fact an anti-confessional position within the confessional
discourse: it asserts the political as the non-confessional versus the confessional, “the people” versus
faith. The political, “the people”, thus draws its meaning from faith, from the “hereafter”, i.e., as the
negative thereof, which is, as I discussed above, “race”. The Talmud is not about the hereafter, but about
collective life in this world, namely, Hitler explains, it provides “instructions for ensuring the purity of
blood of the Jewry [Judentum]”. (id.) “Not . . . but”. This is the structure of the formally critical quality
of anti-Semitic discourse, unveiling truth behind seeming. For understanding the political implications
of this epistemic claim it is crucial to recall the paradox of unveiling race behind confession, i.e., a true
invisible behind a seeming invisible, which is the underlying paradox of crypto-Judaism. It is by virtue
of this logic that anti-Semitism considers assimilated, i.e., invisible Jews as the most accomplished
form of the Jewish polity, an invisible state that would constitute—rather than Renan’s Turkey—the
most accomplished form of race state.
The political significance of this conception becomes more visible in the—essentially
paradoxical—anti-Semitic image or imagination of this invisible Jewish polity. Once again,
the comparison with Marx is illustrative. Marx interprets the disappearance of the Jews, Bauer’s
particularistic “chosen people”, in the process of emancipation as the universalization of Jewish
“egoism”, such that the new Jewish figure is bourgeois society or the common “moneymen”.
Anti-Semitic discourse, in contrast, interprets the disappearance of the Jews in the imagery of conspiracy.
Jewish disappearance signifies Jewish triumph not because Jewish politics has become universally
visible, but, on the contrary, because Jewish particularistic politics has become so powerful as to
control all media, all “conditions of possible experience”, and thus to make itself invisible, which is the
consummation of race politics.
Herein lies the suggestive power of what will become the canonic document of 20th century
anti-Semitism, The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, or as titled in the Marsden translation, The Protocols
of the Meetings of the Learned Elders of Zion.38 In the present context, where the theo-political figure of
crypto-Judaism is posited as an epistemo-political paradigm for anti-Semitism, it is remarkable how
the main motifs of the “Jewish conspiracy” theory are already present in 15th–16th century Iberia, as
described by Yerushalmi. Yerushalmi describes the “historical irony”39 in that precisely the fulfilling
of the Christian hope of Jewish conversion (assimilation) generated the fear of the “inner enemy” (id.),
which in some instances explicitly produced narratives concerning the “existence of an international
Jewish plot that almost anticipates the modern Protocols of the Sages of Zion” (id., 15).
“The Protocols” are in fact a document and not a text. They are an artifact, a piece of evidence
that presents the invisible. Their exact content is less significant than their material existence, which
34 Marr (1879, p. 20).
35 Hitler (Hitler 1943, p. 60).
36 Id., pp. 60, 356. For Eichmann, see Arendt (Arendt 2006, pp. 40–41).
37 Hitler (Hitler 1943, p. 336).
38 The Protocols of the Meetings of the Learned Elders of Zion, with preface and explanatory notes, translated from the Russian
text by Victor E. Marsden, formerly Russian Correspondent of “The Morning Post”, 1934 (no place of publication and
publisher specified).
39 Yerushalmi and Carnaud (1993, p. 14).
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attests to the existence and actual presence (the “meetings”) of the invisible Jewish polity, and in fact
not just attests to it, but re-presents it, reenacts the presence of the Jewish state, in the very clear and
concentrated image of the “Elders of Zion”, and so embodies the disappearing Jews. The Protocols
speak in the first person plural of the “we”—they raise the claim to be read as a recording of the
authentic Jewish voice.
This is why the main question raised by the Protocols concerns not their veracity, but their
authenticity. This question redeploys the various paradoxes of evidenced invisibility: the authenticity
of the Protocols means they make visible the invisible as invisible, whose thus evidenced invisibility
would be the proof for its omnipotence and omnipresence. The connection of power and invisibility is a
political precept confessed to by the Protocols “themselves”, stating as their main principle: “Force and
Make-Believe. Only force conquers in political affairs, especially if it be concealed in the talents
essential to statesmen.” (id., 147). Under these conditions, any positive evidence of Jewish conspiracy
would eo ipso constitute evidence against its power. Thus, evidence is provided paradoxically rather
by the manifest opposition to it, i.e., by anti-Semitism, to which in “the Protocols” the “Elders of Zion”
virtually take credit: “Nowadays, if any States raise a protest against us it is only pro forma, at our
discretion and by our discretion, for their anti-Semitism is indispensable to us for the management of our
lesser brethren.” (id., 169). Anti-Semitism itself would thus be the ultimate living evidence for the
Jewish conspiracy, which is so powerful as to generate the appearance of anti-Jewish reality. Similarly,
the authenticity of the Protocols is structurally proven by everything that speaks against it. Jewish
authorship is evidenced by the lack of evidence of Jewish authorship, as Henry Ford’s The International
Jew (1920) argued: “If these documents were the forgeries which Jewish apologists claim them to be,
the forgers would probably have taken pains to make Jewish authorship so clear that their anti-Semitic
purpose could easily have been detected.”40 Indeed, Jewish authorship is proven by the very denial of
Jewish authorship, as the argument goes: “The claim of the Jews that the Protocols are forgeries is in
itself an admission of their genuineness.”41
There is still much to be asked about the basic epistemo-political conception and presuppositions
that underlie the effectiveness of the notion and image of Jewish politics as “world conspiracy”.
In the framework of this explicitly epistemic study of anti-Semitism, i.e., the study of anti-Semitism
as a phenomenon or constellation of knowledge, namely of a certain reflective relation to an object,
“Jews”, it would be important to interrogate more closely how “the Protocols” and their anti-Semitic
readings more or less explicitly refer to and represent, and thus constitute a certain perception of actual,
self -affirming political and cultural performances of “the Jewish”. One such obvious event was the
First Zionist Congress of 1897, which the Marsden translation provides as the answer to the question,
“When did the Meetings take place and by whom were the Protocols promulgated?”.42 There is much
paradox in pointing at the Zionist Congress as the location of Jewish world conspiracy, of course,
precisely due to the patent nature of the Zionist Congress: both its own constitutive visibility as a public
event and the specific visibility it claimed for the Jews, i.e., a formally distinguished and separate state.
In the logic of crypto- Judaism, however, the Zionist Congress, very much like The Protocols themselves,
was not so much a text as a document, which demonstrated the existence, behind or beyond the visible
event, of an invisible Jewish society, a secret, international Jewish polity, whose paradigm and telos is
not really a nation-state, but a world-state, a cosmo-polis.
40 Ford (1920). The publication states no author, place of publication and publisher specified, and has in its turn raised an
authorship dispute resembling the one pertaining to the Protocols. See Woeste (2012); see also Wallace (2003).
41 As stated in the introduction to Marsden’s translation, op. cit. p. 137. The text nonetheless continues to explain the argument
by criticizing the forgery allegations of evading answer to “the facts”: “for they never attempt to answer the facts corresponding
to the threats which the Protocols contain, and, indeed, the correspondence between the prophecy and the fulfillment is too
glaring to be set aside or obscured.” (Id.). Hitler, who radically asserts the epistemo-political power of paradox, typically
uses the openly and intentionally paradoxical formulation: “[The Protocols] are based on a forgery, the ‘Frankfurter Zeitung’
moans every week to the world: the best proof that they are authentic”. (The Protocols, 337).
42 The Protocols, 137.
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In this sense, The Protocols may be more cogently considered as an anti-Semitic perception
or imagination of the Talmud. The Talmudic texts could indeed be described and read as
minutes, transcripts or “protocols” of discussions between ancient Jewish scholars, “learned elders”.
These meetings, not only the ones of late antiquity and middle ages, but also in contemporary rabbinic
academies, in contrast to Zionist Congresses, have in fact remained invisible for the European public.
The only evidence for their existence is their protocols, the Talmud. From the perspective of my
anti-anti-anti-Semitic investigation, it is noteworthy to what extent in fact the Talmud, rarely mentioned
by anti-anti-Semitic authors, plays a significant role in anti-Semitic texts.43 Much more than Zionist
discourse, Talmudic discourse in fact contains innumerable elements of a universal vision, which may
be very reasonably characterized as worldly-political rather than unworldly-religious. An unlikely
designation for the Zionist nation-state paradigm, “world rule” could be used much more sensibly
for describing the proclaimed Talmudic adhesion to the project of ribonoshelolam, “The Sovereign of
the World”.
In the anti-Semitic representation of the Talmud the universal is subjugated to the particular:
the main point made by all anti-Semitic accounts is the Talmudic political and legal, i.e., normative
distinction between Jews and non-Jews. It has been of course a traditional anti-Jewish trope, as visible
in Kant for instance, to criticize Judaism for being basically a nomos—law, institution and culture—of
particularism.44 The unique feature of anti-Semitism seems to be the notion that this particularistic
nomos is nothing but the expression of a particularistic physis, namely race. Jewish law would be the
expression of the Semitic race spirit, which is so to speak the spiritual incarnation of race. The primary
epistemological feature of this nomos is that it is—like race—hidden beneath the surface of historical
phenomena: it is a secret racial law of an invisible race state that is most powerful when nowhere to
be seen.
In these epistemo-political conditions, the Talmudic or Jewish universal claim can only be
interpreted as a Jewish conspiracy for world domination, the basic principle of which is Jewish
exploitation of non-Jews. Here lies the sense of acute menace arising from the anti-Semitic imagination
of the invisible Jewish polity and the modern event or process of Verjudung. In political terminology, the
Jews are imagined, in contrast to Muslims, the external enemy, as the internal enemy45, which always
means a secret, invisible and hidden enemy, an enemy that does not look like an enemy, but rather as a
friend or better—that has no visible distinction at all. This internal political rivalry is paradigmatically
described as “a state within the state”, an inner state within the state that exploits the state and
does so under the false pretense of being a religion. As Marr put it: “[t]he Jewish confession was
nothing more than the statutes of a people, which constitutes a state within the state and this by-state
or counter-state [Nebenstaat, resp. Gegenstaat] demanded very specific material advantages for its
members”.46 Emancipation would consequently mean admitting the enemies of the state to be its
citizens and potential rulers, “equal political participation in legislation and administration of the very
state they theocratically negate” (Id., 21), which automatically evokes the image of political suicide.
The more extreme anti-Semitic language, asserting more explicitly and radically the logos of race,
does not describe the invisible Jewish state in political terms but in biological terms. The internal
43 There is in fact a motif of “exposing” the Talmud as the secret, anti-Christian and later anti-non-Jews book of the Jews,
which operates as a constitutive act of modern anti-Judaism and later anti-Semitism. The history and development of this
motif can be traced, in German literature, from Johann Andreas Eisenmenger’s Entdecktes Judentum (“Judaism Revealed”) of
1700, exposing Jews’ contempt of Christianity as stated in their “own books”, “so far completely or partly unknown among
the Christians”, to the 1893 edition (Dresden, Otto Brander), which present itself as “literal translation of the most important
passages of the Talmud and other Hebrew-rabbinic literature, to a large extent still completely unknown to the Christians”,
passing through Rohling (1871), and featuring in works such Fritsch’s Anti-Semiten-Katechismus (12ff.) and Hitler’s Mein
Kampf (336).
44 (Kant 2003): “Jewish faith, in its original setting, is a compendium (Inbegriff) of mere (bloß) statutory laws, on which a state
constitution was founded”.
45 Cf. Anidjar (2003).
46 Marr (1879, p. 20).
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malignant Jewish agent is not a state nor enemy but “a foreign element”47 or “a parasite”48, namely an
agent whose harmfulness immediately arises from its foreignness to the organic system, something for
which Hitler had many names, such as “poison”, “spiritual pestilence”, “germ carriers”.49 The inner
destruction that they signify is not death by suicide, but death by disease. It is noteworthy that the
biological semantics detaches its object—and thus itself—from any moral or more generally from any
normative aspects. The phenomena it describes are not in the order of the political but in the order of
the natural. The death and destruction associated with Jewish emancipation arise in a process that
involves no real guilt or responsibility, but is moved by organic necessity. In this sense, the Jews are not
even real agents or causes, but an epiphenomenon of the inner downfall, parasites not of life, but of
death: “like maggot in the rotting flesh”.50
The powerfulness of these strong images, namely what makes them strong images, what constitutes
and intensifies their specific operation of making visible, lies no doubt in their insistence not only on
the death of the body, but on the body of death, on the body as death. The flesh appears there not as
the matter or substrate of spirit and form, not quite as body, but as the formless, decaying biomass,
which above all provokes disgust and horror. Disgust is the basic relation to the invisible not as the
unseen visible, such as the Platonic ideas, which, invisible to the sensual eye, are nonetheless the very
intellectual forms of all visibility, and so shine forth in beauty.51 Disgust, nausea, repulsion, is the
relation to the invisible in the mode of formlessness, or the invisible as de-formed, monstrous, ugly—it
not only evades but repulses the eye, it repulses the will to see. Jews, the racial being, embody the
ugliness of the invisible real, the appalling flesh and blood beneath the skin of appearance. The horror
of their image arises from their essential concealedness. The less they are seen the more horrific their
image gets. Like Baudelaire’s devil, their finest trick was to convince the world, by “the progress of
enlightenment”, that they did not exist.52 Or as Hitler put it: “It is one of the most ingenious tricks
that were ever devised, to make [the Jewish racial] State sail under the flag of ‘religion’.”53 Jewish
politics of race is at its peak when the Jew—together with the Marxists—denies race: “While he seems
to overflow of ‘enlightenment’, ‘progress’, ‘freedom’, ‘humanity’ etc., he himself exercises the strongest
locking-up of his race [ . . . ]. To mask his activity and lull his victims; however, he talks more and
more of the equality of all men without regard to race and color.” (id., 346; 69).
4. Kampf
The anti-Semitic struggle against the Jews, an agenda that immediately arises from the anti-Semitic
representation of the Jews and that becomes ever more urgent as Jews continue to assimilate and
disappear, thus consists initially and importantly in a multifaceted operation of discerning and rendering
the Jews visible. The Jews must be displayed as the invisible being that is concealed by the invisible
being they claim and seem to be: race and not confession. Against Jewish denial of race, anti-Semitism
proclaims and asserts race, is in this sense racist. This seems to go completely against something like
Renan’s “progress of spiritualization”, in which, for the sake of the nation, race is to be forgotten.54
In this Christianist modern logic, race is posited as the sacrifice demanded by spirit, which is seemingly
47 Wagner (Wagner 1869, p. 31).
48 Dühring (Dühring 1892, p. 8); Hitler (Hitler 1943, p. 334).
49 Hitler (Hitler 1943, p. 62).
50 Fritsch (Fritsch 1893, p. 155); Hitler (Hitler 1943, p. 61); see already Wagner: “the flesh dissolves in the swarming multiplicity
of worms” (idem, Juden, 31).
51 Plato, Phaedrus 250d, as discussed by (Heidegger 1996).
52 Baudelaire (1869), where the devil tells that the only moment whenhewasconcerned about his power waswhenheheard a
preachershouting: “Mes chers frères, n’oubliez jamais, quand vous entendrez vanter le progrès des lumières, que la plus
belle des ruses du diable est de vous persuader qu’il n’existe pas!”.
53 Hitler (Hitler 1943, p. 165). For a discussion of affinities between Baudlaire and Hitler on the question of “evil”,
see Hill (2006).
54 Renan (1882).
Religions 2018, 9, 339 13 of 16
the opposite of racist politics, i.e., the justification of political power on the basis of race, a fundamental
feature of all political anti-Semitism and a basic law of Nazism.
This is not the place for a thorough analysis of Hitler’s race theory, but Mein Kampf no doubt
asserts race, i.e., the “drive of self-preservation of the race”, as the basic principle of politics. “The drive
of preservation of the species is the first cause for the formation of human communities” (id., 165);
“all events of world history are only the manifestation of the self-preservation drive of the race”
(id., 324). Like Marx’s “class”, Hitler’s “race” is the collective agent of history; Marxist history is
animated by class struggle, Hitler’s by race struggle. However, whereas the telos of Marx’s history,
the end of class struggle, is to end class, like Renan’s history works to end race, Hitler’s race struggle
does not work to end race, but rather to preserve race. Race struggle is the “means for promoting the
health and force of resistance of the species” (id., 315). Indeed, forgetting race, which for Renan is the
condition for the rise and very event of the modern nation, is proclaimed by Hitler to be the cause
for the downfall of all great cultures in history (id., 316). It is in properly theological terms that he
preaches the principle of race: “The sin against blood and race is the original sin of this world and the
end of humanity that commits it” (id., 272).
This terminology, however, simultaneously asserts and undermines the anti-religiosity of the
race principle. The proximity to theology is in fact greater than it first seems. It shows itself most
clearly in Hitler’s and general anti-Semitic narrative of the actual history of race struggle, as articulated
most fundamentally and radically by the struggle between Aryans and Semites. As is the case in
all race theory, its theology manifests itself in its teleology and eschatology. Indeed, Aryans and
Semites are not just two competing races, like all races. Rather, they represent different moments or
stages in the principle of race, and thus provide the basic articulation of the logic and telos of race
as the principle of human history. The Aryan race stands for the end of this history as culture and
civilization, is thus the superior race, the actual paradigm of humanity. According to Hitler, human
culture is “almost exclusively the creative product of the Aryan”, such that “he alone was the founder
of superior humanity in general, and is thus the paradigm of what we understand by the word
‘man’” (id., 317). What precise quality does the Aryan race posses, which qualifies it for culture?
The foundation of superior humanity, of “culture”, is “the capacity to form a broader commonwealth
[Gemeinwesen]”, namely beyond the natural family, which requires “the readiness to put back purely
personal interests” (id., 325). Culture demands, so Hitler, a “will to sacrifice” (id.), a sense of “duty”,
or “idealism” (id. 327), which means the will to transcend self-preservation and therewith to transcend
race. The Aryan, superior race of culture, would be the race that transcends race, the idealistic,
spiritual race.
Now, “the most radical opposition to the Aryan is the Jew” (id. 329). In contrast to the spiritual
Aryan race-spirit stands the racial Semitic race-spirit, which for Hitler was embodied by the Jews.
The Jews therefore paradoxically appear as the paradigm of race politics, the politics based on
“self-preservation drive”: “Hardly any people in the world have a more developed self-preservation
drive than the so-called chosen ones. The best evidence for this should be already provided by the
simple fact of the mere existence of this race.” (id.) “What an infinitely tenacious will to life, to preserve
the species arises from these facts!” (id.), Hitler wrote in admiration. The problem of the Jews is that
they are too much race, namely lack “the most essential condition for a people of culture, the idealistic
mentality”, the “will to sacrifice” (id., 330).
Accordingly, in Mein Kampf, Hitler can describe his “struggle” in the name of and for the Aryan
race not just as a mere biological, natural necessity, but as a historical event of a religious mission:
“What we have to fight for is securing the existence and multiplication of our race and our people,
nurturing our children and maintaining the purity of blood, the freedom and independence of our
fatherland, so that our people may grow to fulfill the mission that it too was allotted by the creator of
the universe.” (id., 234). The casual “too”, auch, is dramatic here. It shows how easily and conveniently,
in what familiar and obvious way, the bluntest race discourse draws on the tradition of theology.
The theological notion of a collective “mission”, a collective chosenness, election and calling, a collective
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historical pre-destination and destiny, provides the epistemo-political meaning of the category “race”.
The spirit of race, race-spirit, is a divine calling. The “too” invokes of course the other, more well-known,
exemplary chosen people, the Jews, Israel in the flesh, the race of Israel. The chosen race of Israel serves
as the paradigm for the chosen German race—but not only as paradigm: both as a proto-type and
as adversary, namely as an inferior version of itself. Aryan Israel is chosen precisely to fight Jewish
Israel: “And so I believe today to act as intended by the almighty creator: by fending off the Jews,
I fight for the work of the Lord.” (id., 70). Anti-Semitism thus shows itself to be a modern operation of
supersession and Aufhebung—of the race of Israel in flesh by the race of Israel in spirit.
5. Final Conversion
It is in accordance with this political epistemology that the anti-Semitic agenda, its plan of action,
its operative anti, namely its anti-Jewish war, has taken its shape, eventually amounting to what will be
called the “Final Solution” of the Jewish Question, and later the Destruction of the Jews, the Holocaust
or the Shoah. I am aware of the temptation and risk of reading history from Auschwitz backward—but
there is also a risk in avoiding such a reading, which is the risk of avoiding history, namely as a
dimension where ideas become real and reality visible, i.e., history as a dimension of positive political
epistemology. Of course, it is only to a very limited extent that Hitler’s text can be considered as
theory: not only due to the strong anti-scientific, anti-epistemic intentionality of anti-Semitism, and not
only due to the ensuing powerfully operative, militant and sermonic nature of anti-Semitic discourse,
pushed to extremes in Hitler’s text and speeches. Hitler’s text is of course more than that: it is one of
the closest things to a universally accessible blueprint and conceptual matrix for the actual politics
carried out by both Nazi German state and society. It is thus a manifest epistemo-political location,
a strong link between a certain, central and even constitutive modern political epistemology, as I tried
to present it in the basic paradox of crypto-Judaism, and a paradigmatic catastrophe of modern politics.
What was conceived, planned, organized, coordinated and carried out on a world scale as
“The Final Solution of the Jewish Question” was directly conditioned through the interrelated
conceptions and perceptions that were named “The Jewish Question” or “The Question of the Jews”,
the conception and perception of the Jews as the Question. A fundamental anti-anti-Semitic tendency
endeavors to neutralize the epistemic nature of anti-Semitism by denying its Jewish Question any
epistemic relation to the Jews—anti-Semitism would constitute no knowledge, neither bad nor good
knowledge, of Jews. The Jewish Question would have nothing to do with the Jews. This tendency is at
least one significant motivation for the very current use of the term “anti-Semitism”, a modern
phenomenon, which would be essentially separated from traditional, religious “anti-Judaism”,
which, presumably, would know about Jews. Against this anti-anti-Semitic tendency, my analysis
shows that the anti-Semitic Jewish Question discourse: first, constitutes a reaction to, and thus a
perspective on and a perception of the defining modern Jewish event, i.e., the so-called “emancipation”;
and second, conceptually draws, through race discourse, from the theological tradition. Looking
closer at this perceptual and conceptual anti-Semitic knowledge of Jews, I do however concede
to anti-anti-Semitism that anti-Semitic knowledge of Jews is epistemologically negative, which eo
ipso also invokes its similarity to anti-anti-Semitic knowledge of Jews. Whereas the paradigmatic
anti-anti-Semitic perception of Jews is the negative perception of the Jew “flesh and blood”, a Jew
without any concept, form and figure, a Jew behind the “Jew”, the anti-Semitic perception of the Jews
is the double negative of the invisible race behind the invisible confession, the crypto-Jew.
The Final Solution of the anti-Semitic Jewish Question, namely the question, problem or issue
posed by the Jews to the modern polity as a different political entity or a different political being,
could have been neither conversion nor assimilation. Conversion and assimilation were rather the
problem, since it is precisely by disappearance that the invisible comes into being. The less Jewish
Jews seemed, the Jewisher they were. The race state, a human base state, prehistorical origin of
history, re-emerged from beneath the cover of all its historical manifestations, purely present in its
invisible glory. Transcending this origin, this root and race, progressing from race to spirit, to nation,
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to culture, namely consummating modernity by solving once and for all the question of the Jews,
can no longer take place in the dimension of socio-historical phenomena, but must proceed at the root
itself, in the dimension of real being, of the individual “flesh and blood”. The ultimate conversion
from race to spirit is not the disappearance but the extinction of race, the termination of its racial
being, its organic life. The final conversion of the Jews into modernity, as the ultimate moment in the
European “progress of spiritualization”, was to be their conversion from life to death, their physical,
bodily, individual extermination. It is through a striking fidelity to this theo-political epistemology
that the official post-WII memory of Auschwitz, i.e., its existence as anti-anti-Semitic state knowledge,
will in fact conceive and make sense of it by the category of ultimate sacrifice, will name and know it
to be The Holocaust.
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